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ABSTRACT 
 
Among the obligations which countries are required to 
impose upon their financial institutions under the Financial 
Action Task Force’s (FATF) 40 Recommendations is the 
obligation to report suspicions of money laundering. This 
Article discusses the impact that a reporting regime such as 
that set up in the United Kingdom in response to FATF 
requirements is likely to have should it be set up in 
developing countries seeking to regulate mobile money 
services. This Article argues that certain features of the 
U.K. suspicious activity reporting regime make it 
unsuitable for wholesale adoption into such a context. A 
one-size-fits-all approach by the FATF in establishing 
suspicious activity reporting obligations is likely to reduce 
the accessibility, affordability and attractiveness of mobile  
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money services, thus impacting negatively upon the goal of 
financial inclusion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This Article seeks to draw upon the author’s research on the 
United Kingdom’s Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Regime 
in order to establish some preliminary points of discussion 
regarding the impact that a similar regime is likely to have in 
developing countries upon mobile money services which have to 
comply with similar reporting requirements under the international 
standards issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).1 
SAR regimes are set up in compliance with FATF 
Recommendation 20, which provides: 
If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a 
criminal activity, or are related to terrorist 
financing, it should be required, by law, to report  
 
 
 
1 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON 
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & 
PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS (2012), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF% 
20Recommendations%20(approved%20February%202012)%20reprint%20May
%202012%20web%20version.pdf [hereinafter FATF RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
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promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence 
unit (FIU).2 
Mobile money services have made financial services accessible 
to millions of people in the developing world who are not able to 
make use of banking services. Generally the service consists of 
value being loaded onto and stored in a mobile phone account, the 
owner of which can then use it to carry out everyday transactions, 
such as grocery shopping and paying utility bills.3 The service thus 
consists broadly of a financial service (the maintenance of an 
account) and a telecoms service (the transmission of transaction 
messages to move value to and from accounts).4 The provider of 
the financial service (whether or not it is the same person as is 
providing the telecoms service) will be liable to comply with 
certain AML requirements, including customer due diligence, 
suspicious activity reporting and record-keeping in accordance 
with the FATF Recommendations.5 In countries where large 
swathes of the population do not have access to a bank branch, 
these types of services have revolutionized the way that people 
manage their finances. Accessibility and affordability of the 
services are key to the success of the service and to financial 
2 Id. at 19. The text of Recommendation 20 was previously found in 
Recommendation 13 and Special Recommendation IV. 
3 See, e.g., FATF, FATF GUIDANCE ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
TERRORIST FINANCING MEASURES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2011), available 
at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/ 
AML%20CFT%20measures%20and%20financial%20inclusion.pdf [hereinafter 
FATF 2011 GUIDANCE]; PIERRE-LAURENT CHATAIN ET AL., PROTECTING 
MOBILE MONEY AGAINST FINANCIAL CRIMES: GLOBAL POLICY CHALLENGES 
AND SOLUTIONS (2011). 
4 See CHATAIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 12-14, who divide up the mobile-
money service into five elements or functions: (1) mobile communications 
service; (2) customer interface; (3) transaction processing; (4) account 
provision; and (5) settlement. 
5 This is in line with the findings of CHATAIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 28, 
according to whom “the provider who manages the account records is in the best 
position to supervise the AML/CFT procedures of the providers at the other 
stages, and it may be advisable to place the legal burden for regulatory 
compliance on that provider. This is because the account records function is 
where the information about customers, retail outlets, and activity all comes 
together.” 
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inclusion, a major development goal for these countries. 
 
I. FINANCIAL INTEGRITY REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
Under the FATF Recommendations financial institutions are 
required to comply with certain requirements as to customer due 
diligence (CDD, which includes identifying the customer and 
monitoring account activity), record-keeping, and reporting of 
suspicious activities in order to protect financial integrity when 
performing transactions for customers. The expression “financial 
institution” includes any natural or legal person who accepts 
deposits and other repayable funds from the public by way of 
business and/or provides money or value transfer services to its 
customers, by way of business,6 but does not include “any natural 
or legal person that provides financial institutions solely with 
message or other support systems for transmitting funds.”7 It 
therefore includes mobile money service providers who provide 
customers with both the financial and the telecommunications 
services,8 but not those that simply provide the 
6 FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 115.  
7 Id. 
8 An example of this is O2’s Wallet service. O2, a telecoms company, 
allows its customers to deposit money into their electronic wallet up to a certain 
maximum per year. This maximum can vary among customers, some being 
allowed £800, some £5,000, others £10,000. The service will only be provided 
after CDD has been undertaken and the customer has been approved. See 
Finance and Insurance Terms and Conditions – O2 Wallet Agreement, O2, 
http://www.o2.co.uk/termsandconditions/finance-and-insurance/o2-money-
wallet (last visited Aug. 16, 2012). A similar service, Beem, is provided by 
Mobile Sense, also a U.K. company. See Mobile Money, BEEM, 
http://www.beemme.co.uk/legal (last visited Aug. 16, 2012). The website 
indicates that “[y]ou can open a Beem account wherever you are, you don’t need 
to be online. To open on the go just text OPEN to Beem at 07624 81 66 66 and 
follow the simple text prompts.” Using Beem, BEEM, 
http://www.beemme.co.uk/using-beem/account-setup (last visited Aug. 1, 2012). 
In this case a user is prompted to register a debit card, which provides Beem 
with a method of verifying the user’s identity. The limit allowed on a Beem 
account is £300 within any thirty-day period. A Beem account does not require 
linking it to a bank account. In this case the procedure for opening the account 
seems to differ and may need to be completed online. 
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telecommunications service (the sending or receiving of messages 
for effecting money transfers over accounts held with others). This 
means that in countries where bank accounts are ubiquitous and the 
mobile service is simply used to send messages instructing the 
financial institution to effect transactions over these accounts, the 
mobile communications service provider can avoid being 
designated a financial institution by simply acting as a conduit for 
the bank to provide the service.9 On the other hand the mobile 
money service provider may itself want to provide the account 
over which the transactions take place, usually because it is 
profitable to provide the service in view of high demand. This is 
particularly true in countries where large swathes of the population 
do not have access to a bank account. In this case, the mobile 
money service provider will be subject to anti-money laundering 
(AML) and counter financing of terrorism (CFT) rules applicable 
to financial institutions. Because the financial service would be 
provided on a regular basis, the developing country in question 
would not be able to exempt these businesses from the FATF 
requirements applicable to financial institutions.10  
Ensuring accessibility and affordability of mobile money 
services while at the same time protecting financial integrity in line 
with international standards may involve far greater difficulties in 
developing countries than doing so in the world’s advanced 
economies. The table below gives a brief overview of factors that 
are taken for granted in advanced economies that may, depending 
9 See for example the products and services provided by Monitise, a U.K. 
company, which appear to consist of messaging services allowing payments to 
and from bank accounts to be effected over a mobile phone. Monitise does not 
appear to itself provide financial (as distinct from telecommunication) services. 
It simply provides the platform over which such messages may be sent. See 
MONITISE AMERICAS, INC., http://www.monitise.com/ (last visited Aug. 16, 
2012). 
10 Indeed the exclusion may only apply when “a financial activity…is 
carried out by a natural or legal person on an occasional or very limited basis 
(having regard to quantitative and absolute criteria), such that there is low risk of 
money laundering and terrorist financing.” FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra 
note 1, at 32 (emphasis added). Subsequently, “a country may decide that the 
application of AML/CFT measures is not necessary, either fully or partially.” 
FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 20.  
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on the service in question, constitute obstacles in the developing 
world. 
 
Accessibility AE11 DC12 
Register through existing bank account with local 
bank 
Proof of address 
Proof of identity 
✓ 
 
✓ 
✓ 
? 
 
? 
? 
Smartphone technology 
Stable internet connection 
✓ 
✓ 
? 
? 
Affordability AE DC 
Regulation: 
 Does not preclude market-entry by new 
providers 
 Does not make service prohibitively 
expensive 
  
✓ 
 
✓ 
  
? 
 
? 
 
Aware of the obstacles that are likely to arise in the 
implementation of financial integrity measures, the FATF 
published a report on the issue in June 2011.13 This report 
discusses instances of simplified due diligence which may be 
applied where there is difficulty in obtaining regular proof of 
identity and address by establishing alternative methods of 
verification. It also discusses the potential to apply the general risk 
exemption,14 under which financial institutions may be exempted 
11 Advanced Economies. 
12 Developing Countries. 
13 FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 3. 
14 This exemption applies: (a) in strictly limited and justified circumstances; 
(b) based on a proven low risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, and 
(c) relating to particular a type of financial institution or activity. Thus the 
application of the exemption depends on proving low money laundering risk. 
This could be done using Groupe Spéciale Mobile Association’s (GSMA) 
Methodology for Assessing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk. 
See Marina Solin & Andrew Zerzan, Mobile Money: Methodology for Assessing 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks (GSMA, Discussion Paper, 
2010), available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/gfm.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/ 
Tool10.11.GSMAMethodology-AssessingAMLRisk/$FILE/Tool+10.11.+ 
GSMA+Methodology+-+Assessing+AML+Risk.pdf. In the Philippines this 
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from complying with full CDD requirements in respect of certain 
low-risk products. It gives illustrations of different ways in which 
proof of identity and address may be obtained in places where 
people may not be living at a formal registered address and may 
not be able to provide formal proof of identity. For instance in 
India for the opening of a certain maximum-balance and maximum 
annual credits accounts, introduction and certification by an 
existing account holder or any other evidence as to the identity and 
address that is to the satisfaction of the bank, can suffice for the 
purposes of customer identification.15 Special provision is also 
made for customers without any acceptable form of identity, such 
as migrant laborers, opening what are called “small accounts.”16 In 
the Philippines would-be users of financial services from certain 
rural areas can produce a Barangay Certificate (i.e., a certificate 
issued by the elected head of the village) for the purposes of 
customer identification and residence.17 An interesting example of 
the application of the general risk exemption may be found in 
South Africa where Exemption 17 releases financial institutions 
from address verification requirements in respect of certain low-
risk maximum balance accounts permitting only domestic 
transactions below a certain value.18 This exemption has reportedly 
resulted in the more widespread use of financial services including 
a mobile money service called WIZZIT.19 
After the service has been set up and the customer accepted as 
such, the FATF Recommendations require financial institutions to 
monitor their customer accounts and report suspicious activity. 
This places certain burdens on financial institutions and affects 
their relationship with their customers. Some salient features of the 
system set up in the United Kingdom in response to FATF 
requirements and the implications for developing countries 
resulted in lower customer due diligence requirements for certain low-risk 
customers of SMART Communications. See FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 
3, at 23. 
15 FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 29. 
16 Id. at 33. 
17 Id. at 29. 
18 Id. at 32. 
19 Id. at 33. 
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wishing to promote financial inclusion through mobile money are 
discussed below. 
 
II. SOME FEATURES OF THE AML REPORTING REGIME  
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
While much has been said regarding the difficulties of 
implementing CDD requirements in developing countries, less 
attention has been devoted to the problem of SAR. In response to 
the FATF Recommendations, complex SAR systems have been set 
up in developed countries whereby suspicious activity reports 
(SARs) may be prepared and submitted by reporters and accessed 
and actioned by the authorities. The successful establishment and 
operation of such a system require the investment of time and 
resources that may not be available in developing countries. Salient 
features of the U.K.’s SAR system, administered by the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and the difficulties of 
implementing such a system in a developing country are 
highlighted below. 
As FATF Recommendation 20 suggests, the foundation of any 
SAR system will usually be legal provisions laying down criminal 
or administrative sanctions for failure by financial institutions to 
file reports on suspicious activity (i.e., activity on their clients’ 
accounts which may constitute money laundering). In the United 
Kingdom the failure to report an offense is enshrined in Section 
330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA). The provision 
applies to information obtained by financial institutions in the 
course of business.20 If on the basis of such information a person 
knows or suspects or has reasonable grounds for knowing or 
suspecting that another person is engaged in money laundering 
s/he should make a disclosure by filing a SAR, as soon as it is 
reasonably practicable to do so.21 Thus the offense includes 
negligence-based liability. In other words, liability for breach of 
20 Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, § 330(3) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/UKpga/2002/29/pdfs/UKpga_20020029_en.pdf 
[hereinafter POCA]. 
21 Id. at §§ 330(2), 330(4). This implements Article 22(1)(a) of the Third 
Money Laundering Directive, which contains the same wording.  
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Section 330 may arise not only where a person knows or suspects 
and does not file a SAR, but also where a person should have 
known or suspected, as there were reasonable grounds to do so.22 
This introduces an objective test of liability. In order for the 
obligation to arise, the person must be able to identify the 
whereabouts of the person or laundered money or s/he must 
believe, or it is reasonable to expect him/her to believe, that the 
information may assist in identifying the person or the laundered 
property.23  
The failure to report an offense is known as a secondary money 
laundering offense. In certain circumstances, where it carries out a 
transaction for a customer in spite of the fact that it suspects money 
laundering, a financial institution may also be liable for the 
primary money laundering offenses laid down in POCA, Sections 
327-329, in particular Section 328—entering into or becoming 
concerned in an arrangement which one knows or suspects 
facilitates (by whatever means) the acquisition, retention, use, or 
control of criminal property by or on behalf of another person. In 
order to avoid such liability, consent to the transaction must first be 
obtained under Section 335. In order to obtain such consent the 
bank must make a disclosure by filing a “consent SAR.”24 The 
penalties for acting without consent are potentially very serious, if 
it is proven that the act constitutes a primary money laundering 
offense.25 
So what are the implications of these reporting obligations? 
Starting first with the implications for the regulator, a stringent 
22 Id. at § 330(2). 
23 Id. at § 330(3)(a). 
24 Having made such disclosure, in order to carry out the transaction for its 
customer the relevant person must either receive explicit consent, or wait for the 
expiration of the notice period, id. at § 335(3), or, where consent is refused 
during the notice period, the expiration of the moratorium. Id. at § 335(4). The 
notice period is 7 working days, id. at § 335(5), and the moratorium period is 31 
days. Id. at § 335(6). If no consent is received and either the notice or the 
moratorium period (if applicable) has not passed, the relevant person can do 
nothing. If it acts, it may be liable for a primary money laundering offense, as 
provided by Section 334(1). See R. v. Serious Organised Crime Agency, [2007] 
EWCA (Civ) 406, [51]-[52], [2008] 1 All E.R. 465 (Eng.). 
25 See POCA § 334. 
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requirement with draconian sanctions as provided by U.K. law 
typically results in large volumes of SARs, which can only be 
useful to law enforcement if they are organized in and accessed by 
end-users through a central database. In its early years the U.K. 
SARs system experienced substantial backlog problems because 
reports were submitted on paper and then manually inputted into a 
database by the staff of the then National Criminal Intelligence 
Service.26 Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs)—the end-users of 
the reports—had no access to the database, so SARs had to be 
distributed to the end-users within whose jurisdiction they 
appeared to fall.27 In order to address these problems, the system 
was reformed, so that the vast majority of reports began to be 
submitted electronically,28 and end-users were given direct access 
to the ELMER database of reports in 2006. As a result SARs that 
do not produce “hits” when database searches are undertaken will 
not usually be followed up on or used in investigations. Because 
LEAs with scant resources have to prioritize their work, the filing 
of SARs relating to money-laundering transactions where the 
predicate offense is a petty crime can therefore be a waste of time 
and resources for the reporter, unless the SARs in question 
supplement already existing intelligence. Furthermore, the fact that 
so many end-users have access to the entire database, which is in 
effect a database of suspects, can have important implications for 
individual right to privacy and the confidentiality of personal 
information.29 
26 See KPMG, REVIEW OF REGIME FOR HANDLING SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY 
REPORTS: REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 41-42 (2003). 
27 Matthew H. Fleming, UK Law Enforcement Agency Use and 
Management of Suspicious Activity Reports: Towards Determining the Value of 
the Regime 27-38 (Univ. College London, 2005), available at 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/scs/downloads/research-reports/fleming-LEA-SARS. 
28 SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME AGENCY [SOCA], SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY 
REPORTS REGIME ANNUAL REPORT 2011 10 (2011) [hereinafter SOCA ANNUAL 
REPORT]. 
29 See EUROPEAN UNION COMM., HOUSE OF LORDS, MONEY LAUNDERING 
AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM VOLUME I: REPORT (2009), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/activities/UK_Parlrep.pdf, 
where the Committee observed that “ELMER is in effect a database of 
suspects,” id. at 49, containing a large and ever-increasing number of entries, id. 
at 48-49, which can be accessed directly by LEAs not only for purposes related 
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From the point of view of financial institutions that have the 
obligation to file reports, compliance with reporting requirements 
is resource-intensive, in some cases requiring the setting up of 
automated systems for the identification of unusual activity, and in 
all cases requiring staff training and man-hours.30 These costs may 
have to be passed on to consumers in the form of increased service 
fees and charges, which may reduce the service’s accessibility. 
Where the necessary resources are simply not available, much 
suspicious activity may remain unidentified and therefore 
unreported. It is also important to note that the objective test of 
mens rea coupled with criminal sanctions for breach of reporting 
requirements gives rise to a certain amount of defensive reporting, 
i.e., the filing of reports even if the reporter does not believe them 
to be of any use to law enforcement, which is in effect a waste of 
resources.31 At the same time the objective test will not necessarily 
deter service providers who are complicit with their clients in 
to serious organized crime but also for other purposes such as “ensuring 
compliance with tax obligations” and investigating “housing benefit fraud.” Id. 
at 49. It also found it noteworthy that “[o]n receipt of a SAR no steps are taken 
to confirm whether or not the suspicion on which it was based is well founded,” 
id., and that SARs are only automatically deleted ten years following receipt 
(except for SARs that have been amended or updated, in which case deletion is 
postponed for six years). Id. According to the 2011 SAR Annual Report there 
are currently 78 end users with direct access to ELMER. See SOCA ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 28, at 53. However the concerns of the House of Lords 
Committee have been taken on board and some changes have been 
implemented. All SARs older than six years will be deleted from ELMER, id. at 
35, and access by non-police end-users will be subject to compliance with 
Criteria for Direct Access to Suspicious Activity Reports. Id. at 34. 
30 See Fred Hobson, Introduction: Banks and Money Laundering, in BANKS 
AND FINANCIAL CRIME: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TAINTED MONEY 3, 10 
(William Blair & Richard Brent eds., 2008). See also Timon Molloy, Software 
for Suspicion – One Institution’s Experience, MONEY LAUNDERING BULL., Feb. 
2005, at 10-11; Timon Molloy, The Needle Hunters, MONEY LAUNDERING 
BULL., Oct. 2004, at 3-4. 
31 See KPMG, supra note 26, at 34; Stephen Lander, SOCA, REVIEW OF THE 
SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT REGIME: THE SARS REVIEW 16-17 (2006); FIN. 
SERVS. AUTHORITY, REVIEW OF PRIVATE BANKS’ ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 
SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS 26 (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ 
pubs/other/money_laundering/systems.pdf; SOCA, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY 
REPORTS REGIME ANNUAL REPORT 2010 14-15 (2010). 
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hiding instances of money laundering. A good illustration may be 
found in the United Kingdom case of R. v. Swan32 where there was 
ample evidence that both defendants should have been aware that 
their facilities and services (safe deposit boxes and a bureau de 
change) were being used for purposes which were not above board. 
Swan was recorded on tape giving advice to undercover officers on 
how to launder money through the bureau de change without 
giving rise to the need for her to report33 and how to hire a safe 
deposit box anonymously.34 Woolf had on occasion found illegal 
items such as false passports and firearms in client safe deposit 
boxes.35 Thus the existence of the obligation in and of itself is no 
guarantee of the usefulness of the reports that find their way to the 
authorities. 
A further problem is that if a consent system, such as the one in 
the United Kingdom is in place, filing a SAR can disrupt business 
and alienate clients. Two civil disputes which arose in the United 
Kingdom between customers and their banks, Squirrell Ltd. v. 
National Westminster Bank36 and K. Ltd. v. National Westminster 
Bank,37 provide interesting illustrations of the awkward situations 
that may arise as financial institutions seek to operate in the midst 
of impossible conflicts between their duty to act in accordance 
with the customer’s mandate and their duty to abstain from 
carrying out suspicious transactions for the customer until consent 
is obtained. Where a customer is attempting to effect a money 
transfer, and especially in cases such as these involving the transfer 
of substantial amounts of money between businesses in different 
jurisdictions, the delay in effecting the transfers while a financial 
institution awaits consent from the authorities will have an impact 
not merely on the relationship between the financial institution and 
its customer but also on that between the parties to the business 
transaction (failure to make payment would put a business in 
breach of its contract with its counterparty). While the financial 
32 [2011] EWCA (Crim) 2275 (Eng.). 
33 Id. at [3]. 
34 Id. at [4].  
35 Id. at [7]. 
36 [2005] EWHC (Ch) 664, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 637 (Eng.). 
37 [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1039, [2007] 1 W.L.R. 311 (Eng.). 
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institution may not carry out its customer’s mandate (and indeed 
the court held in the above cases that when a conflict arises 
between a financial institution’s duties to its customer and its 
duties under the criminal law, the latter should prevail), neither 
may it explain to its customer the reason why, as, if it does, it may 
find itself in breach of the tipping-off provisions in POCA38 which 
implement FATF Recommendation 21(b).39 While the reporting 
institution is protected, the customer is left, for all intents and 
purposes, without a remedy, though the courts have shown some 
willingness to hold SOCA accountable where it acts outside its 
powers in withholding consent.40 Any suspicion will suffice to 
trigger the financial institution’s obligation to report—the 
suspicion does not have to be reasonable.41 
 
III. PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTING A U.K.-STYLE SAR  
REGIME IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
 
It is not hard to envisage the problems that are likely to arise in 
attempting to set up a U.K.-style SAR regime applicable to mobile 
money service providers in a developing country. First of all, in a 
developing country the application of simplified due diligence will 
be necessary in many cases in order to achieve financial inclusion, 
but where simplified due diligence is applied, it is not usually 
possible to obtain a full client profile. As a result, identification of 
38 POCA § 333. 
39 This provides: “Financial institutions, their directors, officers and 
employees should be . . . prohibited by law from disclosing (‘tipping-off’) the 
fact that a suspicious transaction report (STR) or related information is being 
filed with the FIU.” FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 19. 
40 R. v. Serious Organised Crime Agency, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 465. 
41 “Suspicion” is defined in K. Ltd. v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, [2006] 
EWCA (Civ) 1039, [16] as “a possibility, which is more than fanciful, that the 
relevant facts exist.” In the same case it was held that the existence of suspicion 
was a subjective fact and that there was no legal requirement that there should 
be reasonable grounds for the suspicion. Id. at [21]. In Ahmad v. HM Advocate, 
[2009] HCJAC 60 [30]; (2009) SCL 1093, 1108 (Scot.) it was held that “There 
is nothing in the language of s 330(2) which states or requires that money 
laundering is in fact taking place. It is plain that the obligation thereunder can 
arise if a person suspects or has reasonable cause for suspecting that it is.” 
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suspicious activity will be harder, because the service provider will 
not always be aware of the client’s background and what 
constitutes unusual activity for the client. In addition, the ability to 
file meaningful (and therefore useful) reports will be reduced, for 
example because the client used an alias or because the reason for 
suspicion is not included or is not sufficiently clear to assist in 
gathering intelligence for an investigation.42 
Another problem is that, as far as reporting obligations are 
concerned, under FATF standards no risk-based approach applies: 
all suspicions must be reported.43 Thus reports must be made also 
with respect to suspicious transactions that are low-value and high 
volume, i.e., transactions of the type usually carried out using 
mobile money services. Service providers will need to train staff 
and devote resources to make these reports in spite of the fact that 
individual transactions do not present a significant profit margin. 
This may mean that, depending on the circumstances, certain types 
of customer may have to be excluded altogether. Furthermore, the 
authorities will rarely have the resources to justify the investigation 
of such alleged instances of money laundering,44 at least not unless 
the number and pattern of linked transactions indicates a 
potentially serious problem. It is submitted that any attempt to 
apply a consent regime to this type of transaction would be ill-
advised and likely to fail, both because the timely identification of 
suspicious and unusual activity is problematic for the 
abovementioned reasons, and because authorities are unlikely to be 
able to respond to requests for consent with a promptness that 
would allow the transaction to be carried out smoothly. Even if a 
42 See Louis de Koker, Aligning Anti-Money Laundering, Combating of 
Financing Terror and Financial Inclusion: Questions to Consider When FATF 
Standards are Clarified, 18 J. FIN. CRIME 361, 377 (2011). 
43 See FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 79: “All suspicious 
transactions, including attempted transactions, should be reported regardless of 
the amount of the transaction.” See also FATF, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED 
APPROACH TO COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING: 
HIGH LEVEL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 27 (2007), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/High%20Level% 
20Principles%20and%20Procedures.pdf [hereinafter FATF 2007 GUIDANCE]; 
FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 40-41. 
44 See de Koker, supra note 42, at 377. 
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consent system is correctly implemented, it is likely that customers 
will abandon mobile money services in favor of more efficient 
informal payment methods. 
A final potential issue involves evaluations of the system that 
may be carried out by other countries or external entities such as 
the FATF. In the past the FATF has criticized certain countries for 
the low volumes of SARs being filed, a prime example being 
Switzerland in 2005.45 If the same approach were applied in a 
developing country, SAR systems may be geared by the regulatory 
agencies responsible for them to generate defensive and over-
reporting in order to improve the country’s statistics. An undesired 
effect could be the establishment of (informal) SARs targets and, 
potentially, artificial filings by reporters in order to reach an 
(informal) “quota.” This of course would lead to a further waste of 
authorities’ resources. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The above analysis leads to a few important conclusions. It is 
extremely difficult to construct an efficient and effective SAR 
system. Even in advanced economies like the United Kingdom, 
where a SAR system has been in operation for a considerable 
period of time, there are still open questions as to the system’s 
effectiveness.46 The inclusion of financial activity taking place by 
means of new payment methods such as mobile money within the 
ambit of a SAR system will require that system to be adapted, 
especially where a new type of provider, (i.e., a 
telecommunications company rather than a traditional financial 
45 “The number of reports of suspicions filed with MROS seems low given 
the scale of the Swiss financial market and the activity that is carried out there.” 
FATF, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 
AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM: SWITZERLAND 7 (2005), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/ 
mer%20switzerland%20resume%20english.pdf. 
46 See Miriam Goldby, Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Requirements 
Imposed by English Law: Measuring Effectiveness and Gauging the Need for 
Reform 1 J. BUS. L. (forthcoming Spring 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2012448. 
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institution) with different types of internal monitoring and record-
keeping processes, is providing the service. It is submitted that the 
FATF reporting requirements do not differentiate sufficiently 
among different circumstances and are not appropriately tested for 
unwanted “side-effects” such as wasteful defensive reporting or the 
shunning by consumers of regulated services in favor of informal 
ones, which may be cheaper and more efficient due to the absence 
of regulatory burdens. 
In order to assist developing countries in designing a SAR 
system that will achieve some measure of financial integrity in this 
type of situation, FATF must do its utmost to move away from a 
one-size-fits-all approach and identify the most effective means to 
monitor mobile money transactions in developing countries. This 
entails the possibility of doing away with a traditional SAR system 
altogether and considering alternatives which allow countries to 
tailor their approach to financial integrity to their own 
environments. While the SAR system set up in the United 
Kingdom may be suitable for the jurisdiction in which it operates 
(and even this is as yet an open question),47 the application of 
suspicious activity reporting requirements in the same way in 
developing countries would be unsuitable. In particular, red tape in 
submitting reports should be kept to a minimum and, pending 
development of an appropriate and reliable infrastructure for web-
based communications, reports in all forms should be acceptable. 
Depending on the circumstances, compliance with CDD and 
record-keeping requirements48 may preclude the need for SARs 
except for actual and strong suspicions. Instead a service 
provider’s records on a person officially under investigation could 
be made accessible to LEAs. As we have seen in the U.K. system 
SARs are put on a database which LEAs consult with search terms, 
usually for known nominals, and do not usually of themselves 
form the starting point of an investigation. This being the case, a 
similar effect could be achieved if LEAs were allowed, under 
certain conditions, to conduct searches of the records kept by 
service providers, which would preclude the need to file SARs. 
47 See id. 
48 For a discussion of record-keeping requirements applicable to mobile 
money service providers, see FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 40. 
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When drafting provisions granting these powers, however, it is 
important to build in safeguards against potential abuses by 
governmental agencies, which may have the effect of discouraging 
widespread use of mobile money services.49 
Finally, if a consent regime is put in place, it should only apply 
to high-risk transactions, for example transactions over a certain 
threshold value and/or transactions which the reporter knows or 
has reason to believe are linked to a serious predicate crime such as 
serious theft; fraud; corruption; the trafficking of weapons, drugs, 
or people; or terrorism offenses. 
Much research remains to be done into the effectiveness of 
SAR regimes and this research should be undertaken before 
attempts are made to make these regimes applicable to mobile 
money service providers in developing countries. A one-size-fits-
all approach is likely to result in many unintended effects which 
will at best slow down the dissemination of this type of financial 
service in the areas that need it most and at worst lead to its 
outright rejection by intended users. 
  
49 See Louis de Koker & Nicola Jentzsch, Financial Inclusion and Financial 
Integrity: Aligned Incentives? (July 2011) (unpublished conference paper, Univ. 
of Münster), available at http://dro.deakin.edu.au/view/DU:30041719. 
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